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Abstract
We study how investability, or openness to foreign equity investors, affects firm
value in a sample of over 1,400 firms from 26 emerging markets. We find that,
on average, investability is associated with a 9% valuation premium (as measured
by Tobin’s q). This significant valuation premium persists in firm-fixed effects
regressions, although the magnitude and robustness of the premium is somewhat
lower. Analysis of the components of Tobin’s q shows that firms that become
investable experience significant increases in both market values and physical
investment. These effects are strongest for firms that face country-level or firm-
level financial constraints prior to becoming investable.
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1. Introduction
When the stock of an emerging-market firmbecomes available for foreign investment, the
firm experiences changes in its stockmarket performance and its operating performance.
Stocks of firms opening to foreign investment rise in price (see Henry, 2000a; Kim and
Singal, 2000; Chari and Henry, 2004), and increase in return volatility (Bae et al., 2004).
At the same time, firms that become open to foreign investment experience an increase
in real investment (see Henry, 2000b; Mitton, 2006; Chari and Henry, 2008). In addition,
firms opening to foreign investment appear to experience increases in sales growth,
increases in profitability and efficiency, and lower leverage (Mitton, 2006).
Given the multiple effects of foreign investment on outcomes for firms, a natural
question to ask is how opening to foreign investment ultimately impacts firm value. In
this paper, we combine stock market data with financial statement data in order to study
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how openness to foreign investment affects firm value, as measured by Tobin’s q. In
contrast to previous studies of the effect of stock market liberalisation on stock prices, in
our study we employ a firm-specific measure of liberalisation. Whereas Henry (2000a,
2000b), Kim and Singal (2000), and others measure liberalisation as a countrywide
event, we follow Bae et al. (2004) and Mitton (2006) in measuring liberalisation by
a firm’s investability, which is a firm-specific measure of whether a stock is open to
foreign investment.
Using investability as the measure of liberalisation rather than a country-specific
date has at least three advantages. First, unlike country-specific measures, investability
captures the fact that liberalisation tends to occur gradually among firms in a country,
rather than all on one specific date.1 Second, the investability measure allows for a
natural experiment in which the performance of investable firms can be compared with
noninvestable firms while holding country characteristics constant. Third, since firms in
the same country become investable at different times, the investability measure reduces
concern about whether the observed effects of stock market liberalisation might be more
properly ascribed to other reforms undertaken by the country at the time of liberalisation.
Our study thus adds to our understanding of the effect of liberalisation on value by using
a more precise measure of liberalisation.
The tests in our paper offer evidence on the effect of positive externalities of
liberalisation on firm value. Previous literature hypothesises that when a firm becomes
open to international investment, the increased scrutiny and analyst coverage that occurs
can lead to improved governance of the firm, and that this monitoring in turn can
increase firm value due to an improvement in operating performance or a reduction in
expropriation (see, e.g., Stulz, 1999; Doidge et al., 2004; Bekaert et al., 2005; Mitton,
2006; Bae et al., 2006). In addition, liberalisation can lead to increases in market
liquidity and efficiency, or to reductions in other country-specific risks, all of which can
also lead to higher valuations. Positive externalities would imply a lasting increase in
Tobin’s q due to all of these potential factors. In contrast, standard international asset
pricing models do not necessarily predict that liberalisation leads to a lasting increase in
Tobin’s q. These models predict that when a country opens its domestic stock market to
foreign investment, the country’s cost of capital falls due to international risk sharing (see
Bekaert and Harvey, 2000). This fall in the cost of capital should lead to increases in both
stock prices and physical investment for liberaliseng firms (see, e.g., Stulz, 1999; Henry,
2000a, 2000b, 2003). Thus, while international asset pricing models predict increases in
the components of q (market values and book values of assets), they do not predict a net
permanent increase in q (although q may rise or fall temporarily). We would therefore
interpret a positive relationship between investability and q as being consistent with the
presence of positive externalities such as monitoring or market efficiency.2
We study the impact of investability on firm value in a sample of 1,432 firms from 26
emerging markets. We find that, on average, investable firms have higher Tobin’s q than
noninvestable firms. On average, investability is associated with a valuation premium
of roughly 9%, and this valuation difference is statistically significant and persists even
1 Bekaert and Harvey (2000) emphasise the gradual nature of liberalization using country-
level measures rather than firm-level measures.
2 This interpretation is similar to that in Gozzi et al. (2008), who argue that the bonding
hypothesis would imply an enduring increase in firm value for firms that cross-list or raise
capital in international markets.
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after controlling for size, industry, growth, and other firm characteristics. However,
although simple averages and regression estimates indicate that investable firms have
higher values, these results do not establish that investability has a causal effect on
firm value. It may be that firms that already have, or are expected to have, higher
values (for whatever reason) are those that are made available for foreign investment. To
further address the issue of causality, we employ firm-fixed effects regressions to control
for other sources of heterogeneity across firms. We find that in the firm-fixed effects
regressions investability has a smaller effect on firm value, but that the effect is still
statistically significant for at least one of our two measures of investability. Although
the fixed effects regressions do not definitively establish a causal relationship between
investability and firm value, we cautiously interpret our results as being consistent with
positive externalities in the liberalisation process.
Additional results from the study are consistent with predictions of standard interna-
tional asset pricing models. In additional tests we run firm-fixed effects regressions of
the effect of investability on the components of Tobin’s q, namely market values and
book values of assets.We find that investability is associated with a large and statistically
significant positive effect on both market values and book values. The pattern of changes
in the components of q is similar to the pattern documented in Gozzi et al. (2008) for
firms that cross-list and raise capital internationally. Whereas existing studies document
the positive effect of liberalisation on stock prices, our results add to existing findings
by using the more-precise investability measure rather than a countrywide measure of
liberalisation.
In a final series of tests we assess the role of financial constraints in the response
of firms to becoming investable. Because stock market liberalisation increases the
availability of financing for firms in emerging markets, the effects of liberalisation
might be especially strong for firms that face financial constraints prior to liberalisation
(see, e.g., Henry, 2003; Bekaert et al., 2005; Mitton, 2006). In particular, the presence of
financial constraints prior to liberalisation could magnify both the stock price reaction
to becoming investable and the increase in physical investment for investable firms.
We measure financial constraints using firm-level measures (dividend payouts and
investment-to-cash flow sensitivity). In general, we find that non-dividend payers and
firms with greater investment-to-cash flow sensitivity have greater increases in market
values and book values than do dividend-paying firms and firms with low investment-
to-cash flow sensitivity. The finding that liberalisation especially benefits firms with
financial constraints is consistent with the large literature emphasiseng the importance
of financial development for economic growth.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature that studies how participation in
international capital markets affects firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. For example,
Doidge et al. (2004, 2009) show that foreign firms with shares cross-listed in the USA
have higher q than firms that aren’t cross listed. Gozzi et al. (2008) document trends
in Tobin’s q when firms internationalise (i.e., cross-list, issue depositary receipts, or
raise capital internationally) and find that q rises before and during internationalisation
but falls thereafter. King and Segal (2009) report similar patterns in q for Canadian
firms that cross-list. We establish the impact on Tobin’s q of a different aspect of
internationalisation, the opening of a firm’s stock to foreign investment.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the data used in the
study and provide some summary statistics. In Section 3 we report results on the relation
between investability and firm value. In Section 4 we discuss the role of financial
constraints. Section 5 concludes.
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
734 Todd Mitton and Thomas O’Connor
2. Data and Summary Statistics
We begin our study by sourcing an initial sample of all firms listed in the major markets
of the IFC Emerging Market Database (EMDB) at any time between 1980 and 2003.
The initial sample consists of 2,784 firms that are designated as investable at some point
during the sample period as well as firms that are never designated as investable but are
included in the less-restrictive IFC Global indices. To be included in the final sample,
firms must also have financial data available in the Worldscope database. We are able to
match 2,227 firms (80%) of the initial sample of EMDB firms with Worldscope data.
We then impose a minimum-data requirement on the set of matched firms. Firms that are
investable at some point in the sample period are required to have financial data available
at least one year before and one year after the year in which they are first investable.3
Firms that are never investable during the sample period are required to have financial
data available one year before and one year after the median year in which firms are
first investable in their respective country. Our final sample is outlined in Table 1. After
imposing the minimum-data requirement, the final sample consists of 1,432 firms; 602
investable firms and 830 noninvestable firms from 26 countries. From our initial sample,
we lose all firms from Egypt, Morocco, Slovakia, and Zimbabwe due to insufficient
financial data. The number of sample firms per country varies significantly, ranging
from a minimum of 1 (Venezuela) to a high of 183 (Korea). Korea provides the greatest
number of investable firms (114), while Peru and Venezuela provide just one investable
firm each.
We measure the openness of stocks to foreign investors using the ‘investable’ measure
from the EMDB. The IFC designates a firm as investable if its stock is free from country-
level and firm-level restrictions on foreign investment. The IFC also requires that the
stocks have sufficient size and liquidity to be realistically available to foreign investors.
We define a firm as investable in a given year if the firm’s stock appears in the IFC
investable index by December of that year.4 As a secondary measure of openness we
use the ‘degree open’, a continuous variable ranging from zero (not open to foreign
investors) to one (fully open to foreign investors). It should be acknowledged that the
EMDB investable variables are measured with some noise. An ‘investable’ designation
may not imply the same level for access for all stocks, and the IFC may have made
occasional errors in the designations (see Edison and Warnock, 2003). In addition, there
are likely firms, such as those from the so-called ‘frontier’ markets, that are given a
degree-open measure of zero even though they are in reality at least partially open to
foreign investment. Despite these limitations, it is unlikely that the noise in the EMDB
measures introduces any significant bias in our tests.
Table 1 also presents four key dates for each country: the first year in which sample
firms in each country are designated investable, the first year in which a closed-end
3 There are firms in the sample that become investable more than once, i.e., in some periods
they are designated noninvestable after being designated investable in earlier periods. In
subsequent periods, these firms are once again designated investable. We require data to be
available prior to their initial investable date.
4 For some countries in the sample, official liberalisation occurred before introduction of the
country’s investable index, suggesting the possibility that the EMDB’s investable designation
could lag behind the true investability of certain firms.We address this possibility by repeating
our tests excluding firms from these countries that were designated investable in the first
year of the introduction of the country’s index. Our results are materially unchanged.
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Table 1
Sample statistics by country
This table reports summary statistics of the sample by country. Investable dates are taken from the
EmergingMarkets Database (EMDB). All information onADRs is sourced from the Bank of NewYork,
Citibank, NYSE, and NASDAQ. The number of ADRs refers to the number of firms with ADRs that
also have post-listing financial data. First country fund dates are taken from Bekaert et al. (2005) and
Patro (2005). Official liberalisation dates are taken from Bekaert et al. (2005). Official liberalisation
dates presented in italics represents those countries with pre- and post-liberalisation firm-level financial
data.
Sample firms Key dates ADR
First First Official First Firms
Non- investable country liberalisation ADR in with
Investable Investable Total in sample fund date sample ADRs
Argentina 7 3 10 1994 1991 1989 1997 1
Brazil 31 49 80 1991 1992 1991 1994 16
Chile 17 18 35 1990 1989 1992 1994 7
China 25 26 51 1993 1992 - 1995 4
Colombia 3 10 13 1995 1992 1991 1994 1
Czech R. 4 24 28 1997 1994 - - -
Greece 16 53 69 1990 1998 1987 2000 1
Hungary 5 3 8 1995 NA - - -
India 36 96 132 1992 1986 1992 1993 15
Indonesia 15 47 62 1992 1989 1989 1996 1
Israel 5 15 20 1997 1992 1993 - -
Korea 114 69 183 1991 1984 1992 1993 7
Malaysia 75 79 154 1988 1987 1988 1992 6
Mexico 35 11 46 1989 1981 1989 1991 16
Pakistan 8 28 36 1994 1991 1991 - -
Peru 1 7 8 1997 NA 1992 1994 1
Philippines 18 28 46 1991 1987 1991 1995 4
Poland 2 12 14 1996 1995 - - -
Portugal 13 13 26 1989 1987 1986 - -
Russia 9 8 17 1997 NA - 1997 5
Sth Africa 61 50 111 1992 1994 1996 1994 22
Sri Lanka 6 0 6 1995 NA 1991 - -
Taiwan 47 75 122 1991 1986 - 1992 17
Thailand 38 96 134 1990 1985 1987 1997 5
Turkey 10 10 20 1989 1989 1989 1998 1
Venezuela 1 0 1 1994 NA 1990 1991 1
Total 602 830 1,432 131
country fund is available for the country, the official liberalisation date of the country,
and the first year in which a sample firm in the country cross-lists in the United States
as an American depositary receipt (ADR). Country fund data is sourced from Bekaert
et al. (2005) and Patro (2005). Official liberalisation dates are taken from Bekaert et al.
(2005). All information on cross-listed firms is sourced from the Bank of New York,
and cross-referenced with information from Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, the New York
Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq.
We employ Tobin’s q to measure firm value, where Tobin’s q is defined as the
book value of debt plus market capitalisation divided by the book value of assets.
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Like Gozzi et al. (2008), we ultimately deviate away from the original definition of
Tobin’s q by proxying for market value of debt by using its book value counterpart,
and measure the replacement cost of assets as the book value of assets. Book value of
debt is calculated as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity. Doidge
et al. (2004, 2009), Gozzi et al. (2008), Beiner et al. (2006), and Barontini and Caprio
(2006) also use Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value in their studies on the valuation effects
of international cross-listing, internationalisation, corporate governance, and corporate
ownership structure, respectively. All firm-level financial information is sourced from
Worldscope for each year from 1980 to 2003. We control for firm and industry related
factors commonly employed in other studies using Tobin’s q (see Doidge et al., 2004,
2009: and Gozzi et al., 2008). We use the average (geometric) sales growth (inflation-
adjusted) over the last two years and global industry q to account for firm and industry
growth, respectively. Based upon primary standard industry classifications, the (yearly)
mean global industry q is calculated as the average q of all global firms within each
classification.5 We use the log of sales (inflation-adjusted and in $US), rather than total
assets (given the definition of Tobin’s q) to control for firm size. Finally, we exclude
financial firms since these firms are more likely to be valued differently from non-
financial firms.
3. Investability and Firm Value
This section presents the main results on investability and firm value. We begin with
univariate comparisons. We then proceed to panel regression estimates (pooled ordinary
least squares and firm-fixed effects) of the effect of investability on firm value and its
components.
3.1 Year-by-year valuation comparisons
In Table 2 we compare the value of investable to noninvestable firms in each year from
1988–2003. To compare investable firms to noninvestable firms, we do the following:
first, the mean and median value of each group is given for each year. For each year,
we calculate the difference in means (and medians) for each group, and test whether the
differences in the mean (and median) between the two groups is statistically significant
in each year using a t-test (z-test for medians). In addition, we calculate the relative q
(mean and median-adjusted) for each firm for each year from 1988 to 2003. The mean-
and median-adjusted relative q is calculated as the q of each investable firm divided by
the mean (or median) q of all noninvestable firms in the firm’s home country. A value
of relative q greater than one indicates that the investable firm is worth more than its
average (or median) counterpart noninvestable firm.
5 Firms are designated into one of thirteen industries based on the following classifications
using 4-digit SIC codes: Agriculture and Food (0100–0999 & 2000–2111); Mining and Con-
struction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399); Textiles and Printing/Publishing (2200–2799);
Chemicals (2800–2824, 2840–2899); Pharmaceuticals (2830–2836); Extractive (2900–2999,
1300–1399); Durable Manufacturers (3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579); Transportation
(4000–4899); Utilities (4900–4999); Retail (5000–5999); Services (7000–8999, exclud-
ing 7370–7379); Computers (7370–7379, 3570–3579, 3670–3679); Public Administration
(9000+).
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Table 2 shows that the average investable firm is valued more highly than the average
noninvestable firm in all but five years. We reach similar conclusions when we use
mean-adjusted relative q, which indicates that investable firms are worth more than
noninvestable firms in all but two years. In general, the median investable firm is also
worth more. Investable firms only begin to become worth more than noninvestable firms
in the later part of the sample. For both means andmedians, from 1999 onward investable
firms are worth significantly more than noninvestable firms.
Over the entire sample period, the average (median) investable firm has a valuation
premium of 0.03 (0.06) relative to noninvestable firms. This difference is statistically
significant only for the median. In addition, the mean- and median-adjusted relative q
measures are both greater than one for the entire sample period. Although the evidence
in Table 2 suggests that investability is associated with higher firm value, the results
should be interpreted cautiously given that these univariate comparisons do not control
for other factors that may influence firm value. We control for these factors in regression
estimates in Section 3.3.
3.2 Event-time valuation comparisons
Table 3 compares the value of investable firms to noninvestable firms, not in calendar
time, but in event time. The event-time comparison can shed light on whether there is
a significant change in firm value after firms become investable, or if valuation premia
exist before firms become investable. We denote the year in which a firm first becomes
investable as ‘Year 0’, and compare the value of investable to noninvestable firms in each
year up to five years prior to, and five years after becoming investable. We compare the
value of investable to noninvestable firms in an identical manner to the calendar-year
comparisons presented in Table 2. First, we calculate the mean (or median) abnormal
value of investable firms relative to noninvestable firms in each event year. Abnormal
value is calculated as the value of each investable firm in each year less the mean (or
median) value of noninvestable firms in the same year. In the remaining columns, we
calculate the average mean- and median-adjusted relative value of investable firms in
each event year. The final column of Table 3 reports the number of investable firms
available in each event year.
Table 3 suggests that firm value does not increase after firms become investable.
In fact, the average investable firm is worth relatively less after becoming investable,
although the difference is not statistically significant. The value of investable firms
appears to peak just prior to becoming investable, but falls off thereafter. The statistically
significant valuation premia enjoyed by investable firms over noninvestable firms begin
at least five years prior to becoming investable and end two years after becoming
investable. The fact that the valuation premium exists prior to the event of becoming
investable suggests that investability may not have a causal effect on firm value (although
if the market can anticipate which firms become investable, some causality may be
attributed to investability). The decline in value for investable firms is large enough that
the median firm is worth statistically less than the median noninvestable firm five years
after becoming investable. The last three rows of Table 3 summarise the neutral effect
that investability has on firm value. The last three rows compare the (abnormal) value
for the pre- and post-investability periods. The last row calculates the difference between
both periods. On both an absolute and relative basis, firms that become investable are
not worth more than firms that do not become investable.
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Table 3
Abnormal performance of investable firms relative to noninvestable firms in event time
This table reports the mean and median abnormal value of investable firms relative to the value of
noninvestable firms in event time. The event window is defined as an eleven-year period around the
event year (i.e., Year 0 is the first year that a firm becomes investable). Abnormal value is calculated as
the mean (or median) of the value of investable firms less the mean (or median) value of noninvestable
firms in the same year. Value is proxied using Tobin’s q. Also reported are mean and median relative
q, where relative q is calculated as the value (q) of each investable firm divided by the average value of
all noninvestable firms in the firm’s home country. The number of observations (#Inv) is based on the
available sample in each event year. Asterisks denote significance of t-tests and z-tests of the equality
of means and medians, respectively, where ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Tobin’s q Relative q (Average)
Mean Median
Abnormal Abnormal Mean Median
Value Value Adjusted Adjusted #Inv
−5 0.20∗∗ 0.09∗ 1.06 1.18 126
−4 0.19∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 1.09 1.21 185
−3 0.13∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 1.06 1.17 247
−2 0.27∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 1.11 1.24 363
−1 0.42∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 1.19 1.32 577
0 0.30∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 1.16 1.27 602
1 0.12∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 1.08 1.19 568
2 0.10∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 1.05 1.16 520
3 0.04 0.02 1.02 1.13 468
4 (0.01) (0.05) 1.00 1.10 455
5 (0.02) (0.06)∗ 1.00 1.10 439
All pre-investable 0.40∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 1.11 1.24 1,902
All post-investable 0.03 0.06∗∗∗ 1.06 1.17 3,449
Difference (Post-Pre) (0.37) (0.24) (0.05) (0.07)
We supplement Table 3 with a graphical depiction of the evolution of firm value for
investable firms in event time as reported in Figure 1. The top panel of Figure 1 outlines
the evolution of value for the mean and median investable firm in each year from five
years prior to five years after a firm becomes investable. The bottom panel of Figure 1
depicts the evolution of mean- and median-adjusted relative q in each event year. Figure
1 again suggests that firm value peaks just before the time that firms become investable,
and then steadily declines after firms become investable.
The time-series behavior of Tobin’s q for firms that become investable is consistent
with the time-series patterns of Tobin’s q for firms that internationalise, as reported by
Gozzi et al. (2008), and for Canadian firms that cross-list, as reported by King and
Segal (2009).6 In those studies, as well as in ours, firms opening up to international
6 Gozzi et al. (2008) characterise ‘international’ firms as those that either cross-list abroad
via depositary receipt programs, or raise equity capital in major financial markets. They
show that the time-series patterns depicted for their entire sample hold also for various
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Fig. 1. Value of investable firms in event time.
The top figure displays the mean and median Tobin’s q of investable firms around the time of
investability. Date ‘0’ is the investable date. The bottom panel displays the mean and median-adjusted
Relative Tobin’s q of investable firms. Mean and median-adjusted relative Tobin’s q is calculated as the
value of each investable firm less the average/median value of noninvestable firms.
sub-samples, e.g., Level 1 and Private Placements, Exchange Lists (Level 2 & 3), capital
and non-capital raising lists. Doidge et al. (2009) do not outline graphically the time-series
behaviour of value for firms that cross-list abroad (in the USA and the UK). However, the
coefficient estimates from Table 10, Panel B of their working paper suggests that, like Gozzi
et al. (2008), cross-listed firms experience a run-up in value prior to listing, followed by a
fall-off thereafter.
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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capital markets do not appear to experience a lasting increase in Tobin’s q. The lack of
a permanent increase in q does not seem to be consistent with the presence of positive
externalities. Nevertheless, the multivariate tests in the next section will allow us to more
carefully address this issue.
3.3 Regression analysis
In this section we examine the relation between investability and firm value, conditional
on country, industry, and firm-level controls. Specifically, we estimate the following
panel (pooled ordinary least squares) regression:
Tobin’s qit = α + Xi tβ + Investablei t + Yeart + Countryc + εi t (1)
where Tobin’s qit is Tobin’s q for firm i in year t, Xit is a set of firm and industry controls
(sales growth, size, and global industry q), and Investable is a dummy variable that equals
one if firm i is investable in year t and zero otherwise. Yeart and Countryc represent a
full set of year and country dummy variables.
The coefficient estimates corresponding to Eq. (1) are presented in Table 4. Below
each coefficient estimate we report t-statistics, which are calculated using standard errors
clustered at the level of the firm (in parentheses). We cluster by firm to account for the
time-series dependence in the residuals within firms. Clustering by firm, in combination
with the inclusion of year-fixed effects (which ensure that there is no significant cross-
sectional dependence between firms) results in standard errors that are unbiased when
both a firm effect and a time effect may be present (see Petersen, 2009). Clustered
standard errors are, by construction, also robust to heteroskedasticity. In Column 1 of
Table 4, we regress Tobin’s q on just the investable dummy along with year and country
dummies. The coefficient estimate suggests that investable firms have higher values
than noninvestable firms. The estimate indicates that, on average, investable firms have
a Tobin’s q that is 0.12 higher than noninvestable firms, a difference that is significant at
the 1% level. Relative to the overall average q of noninvestable firms of 1.71, the estimate
indicates that investable firms have roughly a 7% valuation premium over noninvestable
firms. We find that the inclusion of firm and industry-level controls does not reduce
the magnitude of the coefficient estimate, nor its statistical significance. In Column
2 we include controls for firm size, firm growth, and industry growth opportunities
(global industry q). In this regression the coefficient on the investable dummy increases
to 0.15, which is indicative of roughly a 9% valuation premium for investable firms. The
controls are of the expected sign and are statistically significant. Firm- and industry-
level growth impact positively on valuations, whereas size is negatively correlated with
Tobin’s q.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 we control for the effects of ‘indirect investability’.
Specifically, in this study we examine whether foreign ownership of a firm’s stock
enhances value. However, foreigners may be able to take a position in a stock even if the
stock is not directly investable. This can occur either though the issuance of an ADR,
or through inclusion in a closed-end country fund. In order to isolate these indirect
investability effects from the direct investability effects associated with stock market
liberalisations, we control for both in the remaining columns of Table 4. First, we create
separate dummy variables for each different ADR level (Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and
Rule 144a/RegS). TheADRdummy variables equal one in the year inwhich the firm first
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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cross-lists,7 and one thereafter (the dummy becomes zero again if the firm cross-delists).
We classify the ADR levels separately, since exchange-traded depositary receipts (Level
2 and 3) are associated with greater access to capital (see Lins et al., 2005 and Reese
and Weisbach, 2002).8 To control for the indirect investable effects of country funds,
we create a dummy variable called ‘Country Fund’ which equals one for every year in
which a country fund is available for investment in the particular country, according to
the dates outlined in the ‘KeyDates’ column of Table 1. Column 3 shows that Level 2 and
3 cross-listings are associated with the greatest valuation gains, which is consistent with
what Doidge et al. (2004, 2009) term a ‘cross-listing premium’. The presence of country
funds (Column 4) is also associated with higher valuations. Importantly, Columns 3 and
4 show that controlling for indirect investability, either through ADRs or country funds,
has very little effect on the magnitude or the statistical significance of the investable
dummy.
In Columns 5 through 8 of Table 4 we repeat the regressions of Columns 1 through
4, but replace the investable dummy with the continuous degree-open measure of
investability. The results with the degree-open measure are quite similar to those using
the investable dummy.
3.4 Fixed-effects regressions
Although the coefficient estimates from the pooled ordinary least squares regressions
indicate substantial valuation premia for investable firms, these regressions fall short
of establishing a causal effect of investability on value. The positive coefficient on the
investable dummy could simply indicate that firms with higher valuations (for whatever
reason) are those that are selected to be made open to foreign investment. The results
could be affected by heterogeneity across firms that we have not sufficiently captured
with the control variables in Table 4. To address these concerns, we focus on within-firm
changes by re-estimating Eq. (1), but with firm-fixed effects included, i.e., least squares
dummy variable regression (LSDV). Specifically, we estimate the following two-way
fixed-effects model:
Tobin’s qit = α + Xi tβ + Investablei t + Yeart + Firmi + εi t (2)
where Firmi represents firm-fixed effects, and all other variables are as explained in
Eq. (1) (except that country-fixed effects are excluded).
Panel A of Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates of Eq. (2), with t-statistics,
adjusted for heteroskedasticity as in White (1980), in parentheses underneath the
coefficient estimates. In Columns 1 through 4 we report specifications with the same
control variables as reported in Table 4, using the investable dummy as the explanatory
variable. In all four specifications, the coefficient on the investable dummy is positive, but
not statistically different from zero. The coefficient estimate ranges from 0.005 to 0.012,
7 We ensure that we identify a firm’s initial listing in the US. For example, many firms
upgrade (e.g., Level 1 to Level 2 or 3) or downgrade (e.g., from exchange listing to Level 1)
their depositary receipt level. The records displayed on the Bank of New York’s website refer
to a firm’s current ADR listing. We consult historical records in order to identify a firm’s
initial listing.
8 The results do not change if we create a single cross-listing dummy, rather than differentiate
among the different listing types.
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indicating relatively small valuation premia for firms that become investable. However,
in Columns 5 through 8 the results using the degree-open variable tell a different story:
this measure of investability is associated with large and statistically significant effects
of openness to foreign investors in all four specifications.
Although the results using the two different measures of investability are consistent
in that they both produce positive coefficients, the difference in the magnitude and
significance of the coefficients between the two measures is somewhat puzzling. On the
one hand, the results presented in Columns 1 through 4 are consistent with the findings
reported in Table 3 and shown in Figure 1, which indicate that investable firms peak
in value prior to becoming investable and that investability does not produce a lasting
increase in Tobin’s q. On the other hand, the results presented in Columns 5 through 8
show that the value effects of investability are strong even when using firm-fixed effects.
The conflicting results are likely explained by the fact that firms can have a positive
degree-open factor evenwhen their level of openness has not reached the level that merits
an investable measure of one. If investors interpret earlier indications of openness as the
most import measures of investability (or eventual investability), then we would expect
to see stronger effects for the degree-open measure than for the investability dummy.
For purposes of comparison, in Panel B of Table 5, we re-estimate the impact of stock
market liberalisation on firm value, but now we use the official liberalisation dates from
Bekaert et al. (2005).9 The official liberalisation dates are presented in Table 1 for each
country. In contrast to the investability dummies and degree-open measures, the official
liberalisation measures imply that all firms within each country become liberalised
simultaneously. As a precursor, we outline the time-series behaviour of Tobin’s q in
the years immediately prior to, and subsequent to the official liberalisation date. The
result is depicted as Figure 2. Similar to the analysis of Tobin’s q presented in Figure
1, firms appear to experience an increase in value in the period immediately prior to
liberalisation, followed by a fall-off thereafter. However, in contrast to Figure 1, the
magnitude of the post-liberalisation fall-off in value is much less pronounced using
the official liberalisation measures. For example, using the investability dummies, the
average (median) firm experiences, relative to the year in which the firm becomes
investable, a fall in value of about 23% (20% for the median firm) three years after
becoming investable. The corresponding depreciation in firm value over the same period
using the official liberalisation dates is a smaller 14% (and 9% for the median firm).
The regression estimates presented in Panel B of Table 5 suggest the following. First,
in contrast to the results presented in Panel A for the investable dummy, but consistent
with the degree-open results, we find a large (and statistically significant) effect of
stock market liberalisation on firm value. The coefficient estimates on the liberalisation
dummy range from 0.080 to 0.112 and are statistically significant in every specification.
These results are similar to those reported for the degree-open measure. Thus, although
the country-level measure has the shortcomings of not reflecting the gradual nature
of liberalisation and of possibly capturing the effects of other country-level economic
reforms, it produces results similar to those of the degree-open measure, which does
not suffer from the same shortcomings. The liberalisation measure gives results quite
9 The only difference betweenPanelsA andB is that in PanelBwedo not control for the effects
of county fund availability. This is because some studies date stock market liberalisations
as the year in which country funds are first available in a particular country. Consequently,
official liberalisation dates and country funds are likely to be highly correlated.
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Fig. 2. Value of firms around the time of official liberalisation.
This figure displays themean andmedian Tobin’s q of firms around the time of the official liberalisation.
Date ‘0’ is the liberalisation date as reported in Bekaert et al. (2005).
different in magnitude from the results using the investable dummy, but there is also a
large difference in sample size between Panel A and Panel B, because for some countries
we do not have firm-level financial data in the pre-liberalisation period. To assess the
effect of different sample sizes, we replicate the results for the investable dummy in Panel
A, but use only the observations available in Panel B (3,842 firm-year observations). In
these results (not reported) we find a statistically significant effect of investability, with
a coefficient on the investable dummy of about 0.07. The differences in results between
the liberalisation dummy and the investable dummy are not as pronounced when the
samples are comparable.
As an additional robustness check on the firm-fixed effects estimates, in Table 6
we again present coefficient estimates of Eq. (2), but add two other important control
variables. For a firm to receive the ‘investable’ designation, the firm’s stock must meet
two other requirements. First, the stock must exceed a market capitalisation threshold,
set at an average of $50 million over the prior 12 months. Second, the stock must meet a
liquidity requirement, such that the stock must have traded at least $20 million in value
over the prior year and have traded on at least half of the trading days over the prior year.
Because of these additional requirements for becoming investable, it is possible that the
increased value we observe for investable firms are driven by size and liquidity factors
rather than openness. To control for this possibility we add two control variables to the
regression. The first, Market-cap criterion, is a dummy variable that is set to one if the
firm’s stock has market capitalisation of $50 million or more in the preceding year. The
second, Liquidity criterion, is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm’s stock has
more than $20 million in value traded in the preceding year and if it trades on at least
100 trading days in the previous year.
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Table 6 reports results of regressions that include Market-cap criterion and Liquidity
criterion as additional control variables. The first three columns show that inclusion of
these control variables results in coefficients on the investable dummy that are positive
and statistically significant. (The last three columns show results for the degree-open
factor for comparison purposes, although the two criteria do not relate directly to the
degree-open measurement.) Table 6 shows that the results are robust (and, in fact,
stronger) when including controls for the other investability criteria. Thus the results
appear to be driven by the openness of the stocks and not by other related factors.
3.5 Components of Tobin’s q
In Table 3 (and Figure 1), we analysed the absolute and relative time-series behavior of the
value of firms that become investable. In summary, that analysis suggests that the absolute
and relative values (mean and median-adjusted) of investable firms increase in the years
prior to becoming investable, and fall off thereafter. To shed further light on the evolution
of value for investable firms around the time of becoming investable, we examine the
components of value for the full sample of firms. Thus, we separately document the
time-series behavior of the book value of assets and of market capitalisation, where
both values are measured in logarithms and in $US. Gozzi et al. (2008) perform a
similar exercise in their study. We first trace out the time-series pattern of book values
and market values in the eleven-year window (five years before, the year of becoming
investable ‘0’, and five years after) around the time of firms becoming investable and
present these as Figures 3 and 4. In addition to calculating the absolute value of the
mean and median investable firm, for each of the components of Tobin’s q, we examine
their values relative to the average values of noninvestable firms from the same country.
Relative total assets and relative market capitalisation are calculated in the same manner
as relative Tobin’s q (mean-adjusted).
Figure 3 shows that firms experience sharp increases in book values upon becoming
investable. In contrast, Figure 4 demonstrates that (absolute) market capitalisation begins
to fall post-investability. While firms experience a run-up in both market capitalisation
and total assets prior to becoming investable, the increase in market capitalisation begins
earlier and is greater than the subsequent increase in total assets.
To further investigate the effect of investability on book value and market capitalisa-
tion, we estimate firm-fixed effects regressions of the same form as in Eq. (2), but with
book value and market value as the dependent variables. Table 7 presents the firm-fixed
effects coefficients using log of total assets (in $US) and log of market capitalisation
(in $US) as dependent variables, respectively. For both components, we estimate four
separate regressions. First, we regress total assets and market capitalisation on the
investable dummy alone. In subsequent regressions, we also control for sales growth and
for the presence of ADRs and country funds. In these regressions we do not control for
global industry q (given that our dependent variable is no longer Tobin’s q)10 or log of
sales (a proxy for firm size).
10 In their paper, Gozzi et al. (2008) also perform a separate analysis of the impact of
‘internationalisation’ on the components of Tobin’s q. In their pooled ordinary least squares
estimates, they no longer control for global industry q or firm size in these regressions (as we
also do), instead using industry fixed-effects. However, this is not possible in our analysis,
as we estimate firm-fixed effects, as opposed to pooled ordinary least squares regressions.
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Fig. 3. Absolute and relative asset size of investable firms in event time.
The top figure displays the mean and median size of investable firms around the time of investability.
Date ‘0’ is the investable date. The bottom panel displays themean andmedian relative size of investable
firms. Relative size is calculated as the size of each investable firm divided by the average value of
noninvestable firms.
The results from Table 7 indicate that investability is associated with an increase in
both total assets and market capitalisation. In all four specifications, the coefficient
estimates are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for both components.
The coefficient estimates suggest that the increase in total assets ranges from 4.38% to
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Fig. 4. Absolute and relative market capitalisation of investable firms in event time.
The top figure displays the mean and median market capitalisation of investable firms around the time
of investability. Date ‘0’ is the investable date. The bottom panel displays the mean and median relative
market capitalisation of investable firms. Relative market capitalisation is calculated as the market
capitalisation of each investable firm divided by the average market capitalisation of noninvestable
firms.
4.72% for the mean firm. The average investable firm experiences an increase in market
capitalisation ranging from 7.17% to 7.67%.
Taken together, the time-series behavior of the components of Tobin’s q shed light on
what causes the value of investable firms to experience an appreciation prior to becoming
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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investable, peak on the year immediately prior to becoming investable and fall-off
thereafter. The pre-investable appreciation in firm value is caused by the appreciation
in market capitalisation, which begins earlier than the corresponding appreciation in
total assets, and is greater in magnitude. In contrast, the subsequent post-investability
fall-off is caused by large-scale corporate expansion, coupled with a decline in market
capitalisation. While investable firms experience a greater percentage increase in market
capitalisation (compared to asset base) once they become investable, the increase in the
firms asset base is more than sufficient to offset the increase in market capitalisation,
given that for these firms, their asset base tends to be greater than their market
capitalisation. (For example, in the year in which firms become investable, the median
firm had assets in place of just under $498million, comparedwith amarket capitalisation
of just over $328 million.) These results are similar to those documented for firms that
cross-list by Gozzi et al. (2008) in that firms that internationalise also experience an
appreciation in market capitalisation and an expansion in their asset base.
4. Regression Estimates by Level of Financial Constraints
Using the entire sample of firms, most of our tests thus far suggest that investability
is associated with an increase in firm value. In this section, we examine whether there
exist systematic differences across firms. Specifically, we examine whether firms that
are more financially constrained, and thus have more to gain from becoming investable,
become more highly valued post-investability.11 To undertake this analysis, we classify
firms according to their level of financial constraints.
We first use dividend payouts as a proxy for financial constraints at the firm level.
Following previous literature, we assume that firms that pay dividends are less likely to
be financially constrained (see, e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Chari
and Henry, 2008). FromWorldscope we collect data on dividend payouts for all firms in
our sample. We define dividend payers as those that paid dividends in the year prior to
becoming investable, and estimate separate regressions for financially constrained firms
(non-dividend payers), and less-financially constrained firms (dividend payers).
Regression estimates of Eq. (2) for dividend payers and non-dividend payers are
reported in Table 8.We estimate in turn regressions usingTobin’s q, log of total assets, and
log of market capitalisation as dependent variables. The number of observations in Table
8 shows that most of the firms in the sample are classified as non-dividend payers. The
coefficient estimates suggest the greatest gains from stock market liberalisations accrue
to financially constrained firms. Using the investable dummy, financially constrained
firms have larger increases in value (Tobin’s q) associated with investability, although
the differences are not large (a coefficient of 0.012 for non-dividend payers compared to
−0.031 for dividend payers). For asset growth and market capitalisation, the differences
are more pronounced. Non-dividend payers experience a larger increase in both asset
base and market capitalisation. Specifically, investability is associated with a 22% larger
(comparing the coefficients of 0.247 and 0.201) increase in asset growth and 17% larger
11 Laeven (2003) demonstrates empirically that financial liberalisation reduces financial
constraints. However, his index of financial liberalisation does not account for stock market
liberalisations. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) overcome this shortcoming, and construct
an index of financial liberalisation that accounts for domestic financial sector reform, stock
market liberalisations, and capital account liberalisation.
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Table 8
Firm-fixed effect estimates by level of dividend payout
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute
value), adjusted for heteroskedasticity, in parentheses. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, the logarithm
of total assets (in $US), or the logarithm of market capitalisation (in $US) as indicated. Separate
regressions are reported for firms that were and were not dividend payers in the year prior to becoming
investable. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated
as investable. The degree open factor ranges from zero (not open to foreign investors) to one (fully
open to foreign investors). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $US. Firm growth is
measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global industry q is
calculated as the average q of all global firms within each industry classification. Also estimated but
not reported are a constant and a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is denoted by ∗∗∗,
∗∗, ∗ for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dividend Payers Non-Dividend Payers
Tobin’s q Asset MCap Tobin’s q Asset MCap
Investable −0.031 0.201∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.012 0.247∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗
[0.88] [6.24] [7.18] [0.79] [12.26] [11.71]
Firm Size 0.010 0.019
[0.30] [1.34]
Firm Growth 0.179∗∗ −0.082 0.161 0.358∗∗∗ 0.041 0.426∗∗∗
[2.23] [1.02] [1.24] [5.36] [0.63] [3.92]
Global Industry q 0.642∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
[8.05] [8.03]
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs # 4,500 4,500 4,500 9,517 9,517 9,517
R-Squared 0.130 0.031 0.069 0.084 0.030 0.121
Degree open 0.022 0.106∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
[0.43] [2.68] [3.48] [3.77] [6.29] [7.03]
Firm Size 0.003 0.017
[0.17] [1.17]
Firm Growth 0.185∗∗ −0.106 0.123 0.352∗∗∗ 0.028 0.401∗∗∗
[2.29] [1.31] [0.95] [5.27] [0.42] [3.65]
Global Industry q 0.644∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
[8.09] [7.92]
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs # 4,500 4,500 4,500 9,517 9,517 9,517
R-Squared 0.132 0.004 0.027 0.087 0.001 0.057
(comparing the coefficients of 0.423 and 0.359) increase in market capitalisation.12
Using the degree-open measure, the results are similar, except that here the increase in
Tobin’s q for non-dividend payers is much larger and statistically significant (at the 1%
level).
The finding that non-dividend payers experience a larger increase in asset growth
upon becoming investable, relative to dividend payers, is indicative of stock market
12 Mitton (2006) also finds that non-dividend payers invest more upon becoming investable.
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liberalisation playing a role in reducing financial constraints for emerging market firms.
If one of the benefits of stock market liberalisation is that it opens a new financing
channel, then the effects of liberalisation would be expected to be stronger for firms that
are in greater need of additional financing.
Finally, we investigate the effect of one other firm-level measure of financial
constraints, investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. Following previous literature, we assume
that financial constraints are increasing in investment-to-cash flow sensitivities (see,
e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988). We classify investable firms as financially constrained if
their pre-investable investment-to-cash flow sensitivity is above the sample median.
We estimate the investment-to-cash flow sensitivity for each firm from a regression of
investment (capital expenditures to book assets) on cash flow (free cash flow to book
assets) and lagged growth opportunities (market to book assets). Regression estimates of
Eq. (2) for above- and below-median investment-to-cash flow sensitivities are reported
in Table 9. As in Table 8, we estimate regressions using Tobin’s q, total assets, and
market capitalisation as dependent variables. The coefficient estimates again suggest
the greatest gains from stock market liberalisations accrue to financially constrained
firms. Using the investable dummy, financially constrained firms have larger increases
in value (Tobin’s q) associated with investability, and in this instance the differences are
quite large (a coefficient of 0.079 for above-median investment-to-cash flow sensitivity
firms compared to−0.011 for below-median investment-to-cash flow sensitivity firms).
For asset growth the differences are also large, but less financially constrained firms
experience the largest increase in their asset base. Changes in market capitalisations
are similar across both sets of firms. Using the degree-open measure, the results are
similar. Again, financially constrained firms have larger increases in value (Tobin’s q)
associated with investability (a coefficient of 0.104 for above-median investment-to-cash
flow sensitivity firms compared to a statistically insignificant 0.074 for below-median
investment-to-cash flow sensitivity firms).
Taken together, the results in Tables 8 and 9 are strongly suggestive of benefits to
firms that become investable, particularly to those that have financial constraints.
5. Conclusion
A great deal of research has focused on the effects on performance when firms from
emerging markets pass through different steps in a process of globalisation. We add
to this literature by documenting the valuation effects when firms are opened to
foreign equity investment. We find significant effects when firms become investable:
increases in market valuations and in real investment both appear to be associated
with investability. These results add to prior research on the effects of stock market
liberalisations by documenting stock price increases associated with liberalisation, but
using a firm-specific, rather than marketwide, measure of openness. The effects of
investability on market valuations and investment are particularly strong for firms that
are subject to financial constraints prior to becoming investable. Although our results
do not definitively establish the presence of a causal effect of investability on firm value
(as measured by Tobin’s q), the firm fixed-effects regression and cross-sectional tests
that we employ provide some assurance of a causal effect. Our results appear to be
consistent with the predictions of standard international asset pricing models as well as
with the presence of positive externalities arising from the liberalisation process. In the
end, although our findings do not address other potential risks of opening up to foreign
C© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Table 9
Firm-fixed effect estimates by level of financing constraints using investment-to-cash
flow sensitivities
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute
value), adjusted for heteroskedasticity, in parentheses. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q, the logarithm
of total assets (in $US), or the logarithm of market capitalisation (in $US) as indicated. Separate
regressions are reported for firms that were and were not above the sample median investment-to-cash
flow sensitivities. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is
designated as investable. The degree open factor ranges from zero (not open to foreign investors) to
one (fully open to foreign investors). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $US. Firm
growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global
industry q is calculated as the average q of all global firms within each industry classification. Also
estimated but not reported are a constant and a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is
denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Above Median I/CF Sensitivity Below Median I/CF Sensitivity
Tobin’s q Asset MCap Tobin’s q Asset MCap
Investable 0.079∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ −0.011 0.357∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗
[2.78] [7.91] [10.74] [0.17] [6.27] [5.04]
Firm Size −0.028∗∗∗ −0.023
[4.79] [0.90]
Firm Growth 0.337∗∗∗ −0.058 0.354∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
[4.94] [0.82] [3.35] [2.69] [2.27] [3.99]
Global Industry q 0.316∗∗∗ 0.187∗
[4.79] [1.86]
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs # 5,637 5,637 5,637 3,576 3,576 3,576
R-Squared 0.110 0.054 0.163 0.136 0.078 0.104
Degree open 0.104∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.074 0.212∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
[3.60] [2.54] [5.15] [1.00] [3.57] [2.67]
Firm Size −0.026∗ −0.024
[1.67] [0.96]
Firm Growth 0.332∗∗∗ −0.058 0.349∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.181∗ 0.540∗∗∗
[4.85] [0.80] [3.28] [2.71] [1.93] [3.71]
Global Industry q 0.312∗∗∗ 0.183∗
[4.71] [1.80]
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs # 5,637 5,637 5,637 3,576 3,576 3,576
R-Squared 0.107 0.001 0.065 0.139 0.010 0.072
investment (such as crisis susceptibility), they add to our understanding of the perceived
benefits of stock market liberalisation on firm performance.
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